Commercial non-aerospace technology transfer program for the 2000s: Strategic analysis and implementation by Horsham, Gary A. P.
NASA Technical Memorandum 4424
Commercial Non-Aerospace Technology
Transfer Program for the 2000s:
Strategic Analysis and Implementation
Gary A. P. Horsham
NASA Office of Commercial Programs
Washington, D.C.
(NASA-TM-4424) COMMERCIAL
NNN-AERgSPACE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
PROGRAM FOR THE 2000S: STRATEGIC
ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION (NASA)
48 p
Hi/e5
N93-13433
Unclas
0131941
NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of Management
Scientific and Technical
Information Program
1992
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19930004245 2020-03-17T10:09:36+00:00Z

Table of Contents
1.0
2.0
Introduction
External Environmental Assessment
2.1 Legislative Background
2.2 National Policy Considerations
3.0 Internal Environmental Assessment
3.1 Background
3.2 Policy Considerations
4.0 Present Evolutionary Characteristics
4.1 Federal Inter-Sector Technology Transfer System
4.2 Technology Transfer Center System
4.3 NASA Extra-Sector Technology Transfer System
4.3.1 Applications Engineering System
4.3.2 Outreach System
4.3.3 Software Engineering and Distribution System
4.3.4 Remote Sensing and Information Distribution System
4.3.5 Communications Network Upgrade System
4.4 Near-Term Direction and Aims
4.5 Future Program Objectives
5.0 Strengths and Weaknesses
5.1 Current Strengths
5.2 Current Weaknesses
6.0 Strategy and Implementation
6.1 Harmonization and Responsiveness Strategy
6.2 Implementation Plan
6.2.1 Weakness Correction
7.0 Conclusion
2
2
3
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
11
12
12
13
14
15
15
15
6
16
18
18
19
iii PRECEDING P/IGE BLANK .I';OT RLMED
Figures
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 2A
Figure 2B
Figure 2C
Figure 3A
Figure 3B
Figure 3C
Figure 4A
Figure 4B
Figure 4C
Figure 4D
Figure 5A
Figure 5B
Commercial Non-Aerospace Technology Transfer
Program Plan
Transitional (FY 1992)
- NASA Technology Transfer Division
Baseline (FY 1992- 1993)
- NASA Technology Transfer Division
Implementation Strategy (FY 1994- 1995)
- NASA Technology Transfer Division
Implementation Strategy (FY 1996- 2000)
- Office of Federal Inter-Sector Technology Transfer
Baseline (FY 1§92)
- Technology Transfer Center System
Implementation Strategy (FY 1993- 1995)
- Technology Transfer Center System
Implementation Strategy (FY 1996 - 2000)
- Technology Transfer Center System
Baseline (FY 1992)
- Applications Engineering
Implementation Strategy (FY
- Commercial Applications
Implementation Strategy (FY
- Commercial Applications
Implementation Strategy (FY
- Commercial Applications
Baseline (FY 1992)
- Outreach System
Implementation Strategy (FY 1993)
- Multi-Sector Outreach System
System
1993 - 1995)
Engineering System
1996- 1997)
Engineering System
1998 - 2000)
Engineering System
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
iv
Figures (continued)
Figure 5C Implementation Strategy (FY 1993 - 1995)
- Multi-Sector Outreach System
35
Figure 5D Implementation Strategy (FY 1996 - 2000)
- Multi-Sector Outreach System
36
Figure 6A Baseline (FY 1992)
- Software Engineering and Distribution System
37
Figure 6B Implementation Strategy (FY 1993 - 2000)
- Software Engineering and Distribution System
38
Figure 7A Baseline (FY 1992)
- Remote Sensing and Information Distribution System
39
Figure 7B Implementation Strategy (FY 1993 - 2000)
- Remote Sensing and Information Distribution System
40
Figure 8 Implementation Strategy (FY 1993 - 1994)
- Communications Network Upgrade System
41
'V
List of Acronyms
ABP
CAES
CASI
CoC
COSMIC
CTI
CUFT
DOC
DoD
DOE
FISTTS
FLC
FY
IAC
ICT
MSOS
NASA
NESTTS
NTI
NTTC
OCP
ORTA
OSTP
RBSE
RSIDS
RTi
R]-FC
SEDS
SIC
SRI
TAC
TAT
TTCS
I-I-D
13O
Associated Business Publications
Commercial Applications Engineering System
Center for Aerospace Information
Council on Competitiveness
Computer Software Management and Information Center
Civil Technology Initiative
Center for the Utilization of Federal Technology
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Federal Inter-Sector Technology Transfer System
Federal Laboratory Consortium
Fiscal Year
Industrial Application Center
International Computer Technologies
Multi-Sector Outreach System
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA Extra-Sector Technology Transfer System
National Technology Initiative
National Technology Transfer Center
Office of Commercial Programs
Office of Research and Technology Applications
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Repository-Based Software Engineering
Remote Sensing Information Distribution System
Research Triangle Institute
Regional Technology Transfer Center
Software Engineering and Distribution System
Standard Industrial Code
Stanford Research Institute
Technology Applications Center
Technology Application Team
Technology Transfer Center System
Technology Transfer Division
Technology Transfer Office
vi
Commercial Non-Aerospace
Technology Transfer Program for the 2000s:
Strategic Analysis and Implementation
NASA Headquarters
Office of Commercial Programs
Technology Transfer Division
Gary A. P. Horsham
1.0 Introduction
By the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States will probably be forced
to have an "official" industrial/technology policy, in order to be a successful player in
the newly emerging global economic arena. Given today's changing international
economic conditions, it is clear that techno-economic governmental agencies (such as
NASA) will most likely have to initiate and lead a process to harmonize
federal/state/local agency to agency and public to private working interfaces.
As the year 2000 approaches, many fundamental politico-techno-economic paradigms
and rules of twentieth century engagement will probably be discarded. The coming era
will almost certainly alter some traditional relationship between the U.S. public and
private sectors. Any economic efficiency/effectiveness oriented program/strategy (such
as technology transfer) must be flexible enough to respond to the rapid changes of a
highly uncertain environment. Given these considerations (and in concordance with
the new NASA Administrator's "better, faster, cheaper," philosophy), NASA's twenty-
first century technology transfer organization should be shaped by the principles of
harmonization and responsiveness - that is, to help harmonize or coordinate public
sector technology transfer instruments, as a whole, to make them more responsive to
private sector technology transfer needs in the future.
This report presents a strategic analysis and implementation plan for NASA's Office of
Commercial Programs (OCP), Technology Transfer Division's (TTD), Technology
Transfer Program. The main objectives of this study are to (1) analyze and
characterize the NASA TTD's environment and past organizational structure, (2)
clearly identify current and prospective programmatic efforts, (3) determine an
evolutionary view of an organizational structure which could lead to the
accomplishment of NASA's future technology transfer aims, and (4) formulate a
strategy and plan to improve NASA's (and other federal agencies') ability to transfer
technology to the non-aerospace sectors of the U.S. economy. The planning horizon
for this study extends through the remainder of the 1990s to the year 2000.
Five sections follow this introduction. The first two present supplementary,
chronological external and internal environmental assessments in which pertinent
legislative, national policy, and other background factors are introduced. After this, an
overview/examination of each of the current TTD organizational components are
presented and explained from a systems perspective. Near-term factors which tend to
govern future programmatic trends are discussed. Then, in relation to these factors, the
present organization's near-term direction and aims are discussed, followed by an
outline of future programmatic objectives. In the first of two remaining sections, the key
strengths and weaknesses of the current organization are identified based on all the
information discussed previously. The last section presents a strategy and
implementation methodology.
2.0 External Environmental Assessment
2.1 Legislative Background
NASA (with its nine field Installations) was the first federal agency to formally estaSlish
a technology transfer function in 1962. In 1971, eleven Department of Defense (DoD)
laboratories established the Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) (which has
expanded to include over six-hundred DoD and non-DoD laboratories). Both the
FLC's and NASA's technology transfer functions operated independently throughout
the 1970s without any stron# supporting legislation. During the late 1970s, Congress
adclressed the need for additional legislation to encourage more effective extra- --
governmental (inter-sectoral) technology transfer. This resulted in the passage of the
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act (Public Law 96-480) of 1980. The Act
mandated that "federal laboratories transfer federally originated technology to state
and local governments and to the private sector."
In 1984, in response to the Stevenson-Wydler Act, most federal laboratories
established what are still referred to as Offices of Research and Technology
Applications (ORTAs). In addition, the Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC) (the "ad
hoc" association of ORTAs) was formally recognized by the Joint Economic Committee
of the Congress as the main organ for generating intra- and extra-governmental
technology transfer. To complement these activities, the Department of Commerce
established the Center for the Utilization of Federal Technology (CUFT). CUFT would
provide a service as a "clearinghouse for the dissemination of information on federal
technologies with potential application to state and local governments and to private
industry."
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The Stevenson-Wydler Act approached maximum effectiveness by 1984. By then it
became evident that further legislative action would be necessary to "incentivize"
federal laboratories. To address this need, the Federal Technology Transfer Act
(Public Law 99-502) of 1986 was enacted to provide a statutory basis for the role of the
Federal Laboratory Consortium (FLC). Each of these pieces of federal legislation
forms the pillars of the external framework of inducements by which all federal
technology transfer functions are encouraged and supported.
2.2 Nation#l PI_O_E""""_Considerations
The industrial and federal technology transfer communities were recently stimulated
by a series of policy related activities. In 1990, the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) compiled a list of "critical technologies" which must be mastered in
order to ensure U.S. economic (international) competitiveness in the early twenty-first
century. This list resulted from the merging of three individual preceding lists compiled
by the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the
Department of Energy (DOE), respectively. As a result, a series of public policy
debates and congressional hearings have occurred on the subject of establishing an
official United States "technology/industrial policy."
Certain influential elements of the Council on Competitiveness (CoC) have articulated
support for establishing an "official" United States technology policy, predicated upon
the critical technologies lists. This would be tantamount to an acknowledgement and
strategical response by the United States to the rules of the new tri-polar international
economic game - with Japan (including the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN)) and the European Community. In any case, strong philosophical opposition
has been voiced by organizations such as the American Enterprise Institute (which
believes, along with many other right wing organizations, that the government should
not get into the business of picking winners).
The present (Bush) Administration has been officially opposed to the notion of any
policy proposals which violate its free market economic doctrine. Nonetheless, the
pressing need for Presidential leadership in the face of blistering economic
competition (from Japan and other Asian nations and the European Community), and
the pressures of domestic, election-year politics, prompted some philosophically
contrary action. In late 1991 and early 1992, the Administration launched the Civilian
Technology Initiative (CTI) and its companion, the National Technology Initiative (NTI).
These initiatives, particularly the NTI, have inspired a burst of high level interest in
technology transfer in many mission-dependent, technology development oriented
agencies (Department of Defense, Department of Energy, NASA, etcetera).
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Recent actions by the military mission-dependent federal agencies to emphasize
technology transfer are largely in response to the threatening effects of some
permanent institutional restructuring in the domestic and geo-political arenas, which
are perceived threats to their existence. The most significant concerns stem from the
end of the cold-war, and the worsening U.S. domestic social and fiscal climate (largely
caused by the seemingly endemic budget deficit, and the increasing interest due on
the national debt). These austere conditions are almost certain to have severe policy
and budgetary ramifications for most mission-dependent federal organizations in the
1990s (and, perhaps, into the first decade of the twenty-first century).
3.0 Internal Environmental Assessment
3.1 Backg(_und
Afte( being created and given a legal framework and authority in 1958 to "exploi'e °
space," NASA committed virtually all its resources to the "Moon Mission" proclam&t_0n
of 1960. The A-gency was essentially an instrument of the mid-cold-war peri0d.-_dng-
the early 1960s, Congress provided the Agency with relatively easy access to funding
needed to execute its prime mission. The Agency was a beneficiary of abundant -
discretionary reserves which had accrued from about two decades of uncontested
international economic growth in all sectors. NASA first instituted an "extra-sectorar'
technology transfer function back in 1962 to demonstrate the "benefits to all mankind,"
as stipu!ated in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. However, [echnology
transfer never received sufficient internal (NASA) support to become maximally
effective, due to the Agency's intensely focused advanced (space) missions oriented
culture.
Throughout the 1960s, NASA was a young and unique new agency - the special
creation of a resource rich, super-powerful, economically unchallenged United States
at the crest of its competitive form, militarily, in all important areas. The Agency was not
held accountable for economic performance, and so its leadership had no incentive to
interpret changes in the economic environment. Almost complete emphasis was
placed on responding to (space/aeronautical related) technological challenges/threats
in the geo-political environment. As a competitive instrument of the cold-war, the
young agency learned to value international recognition and leadership, technological
superiority, mission success, and scientific inquiry. The value for technology transfer
as a means of multiplying the tangible benefits from space expenditures (i.e., making
space expenditures a more widespread economic investment/stimulant) was never
properly instilled.
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As NASA matured, it continued to thrive on the competitive tensions of the cold war
throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s. The Agency was still incapable of seeing
the necessity of formulating an all encompassing strategic view of itself in the face of
very obvious changing social, political, and economic indicators. The demise of a
military pretext, and the increasing relative importance of economic competition in the
1990s (fiscal/financial accountability and non-aerospace economic return/payback),
have now come together to force greater institutional acceptance of, and real support
for a "return on investment" function like technology transfer.
There still exist some remnants of the cold-war era mind-set/culture throughout
NASA's organizational structure(s), at headquarters, and also at the nine field
Installations. This mind-set tends to lack a practical appreciation for the larger socio-
economic context in which the Agency must exist (and on which its continued
existence increasingly depends). Such a mind-set yearns for a semblance of a 1960s-
like (Apollo) period when a strict science and technology focused raison d'etre was the
only one necessary. This dominant culture views non-aerospace (extra-sectoral)
technology transfer as a second class function, unsuited to the image of an agency on
the vanguard of space exploration. To this culture, active technology transfer (for non-
aerospace applications) is ordinary and perfunctory, and should not be part of NASA's
(noble) responsibility or "Mission."
3.2 P__ Considerations
In the past, the governing attitude in NASA believed that the Agency should continue
to be well funded solely on the basis of its contribution to national pride and "manifest
destiny." In other words, technological achievement, and the acquisition of space
scientific knowledge, should be the Agency's only products, and, therefore, its only
measures of success. By projecting such an imbalancecl idealism, this attitude has
acted to negate the internal effectiveness of its Technology Transfer Division (TTD)
and the supporting Technology Transfer Offices at each field Installation. In principle,
the solution to this problem is education. This can be achieved through the creation of
better, more internally active organizational linkages between the "l-rD's structure and
the overall NASA organization.
There are two aspects to the internal environment for which more effective and
cooperative linkages must be established: (1) the immediate internal environment
(e.g., at headquarters, the TTD's mother/foster organization, Code C, Office of
Commercial Programs (OCP) and its other related functions.); and, (2) the non-
immediate internal environment (e.g., at headquarters, OCP's mother/foster
organization, NASA Headquarters, and its other Codes or related functions.).
Similarly, at each field Installation, there is both an immediate and a non-immediate
internal environment surrounding the TTO. From a policy standpoint, each entity in the
immediate and non-immediate internal environments of the TTD/TTO is a stakeholder
which needs to be better educated and informed.
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In other areas, the actions of the TTD (and TTO) are controlled by formal and informal
policies/guidelines within its NASA internal environment. The TTD/TTO must conduct
and modify its activities relative to the Agency's internal policies and guidelines in the
following areas: human resource management and consumption, contractual support
and management, financial management and budgetary preparation, inter- and intra-
organization (and vertical and horizontal protocol) communication, congressional
interaction, public promotion (external relations), performance measurements,
etcetera. The TTD/TTO tends to encounter non-policy related obstacles, due to the
unsupportive, informal value system that drives the Agency. This has acted to further
suboptimize the TTD'sf'l'l'O's internal (and external, to some extent) effectiveness.
It is interesting to note, that the new NASA Administrator (in the/atter half of fiscalyear
(FY) 1992) has instituted a process of change to increase the Agency's internal
awareness of its national economic responsibilities, among other..................things This pr_ocess
is designed to increase the internal (and external) visibility of technology transfer,
thereby making it a major component of NASA's total responsibility. However, it
remains to be seen at what rate the traditional NASA establishment will yield to this
and other inevitable modern era forces or indicators of change.
4.0 Present Evolutionary Characteristics
Between FY 1991 and 1992, NASA's Technology Transfer Division ('I-ID) launched
the development of an improved (NASA sponsored) "National Technology Transfer
Network." In order to facilitate the systems analysis approach applied in this study, the
author has chosen to describe the "Network" (unofficially) as a "Federal inter-S_
Technology Transfer--System(FISTTS)" ( where "inter-sectorai_' implies trans_r_m
public sector to public sector, or, public sector to private sector). The following sections
discuss the present evolutionary characteristics of each component of the FISTTS and
introduce systemic/systematic relationships, nomenclature and acronyms, accordingly.
t
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4.1 Federal Inter-Sector Technology Transfer System
The FISI-rS is geographically distributed throughout the United States. Its primary
function is to enable/facilitate more efficient and effective technology transfer from any
federal laboratory (with a primary emphasis on NASA laboratories) to private and
other public sectors through a well coordinated network of federal and contracted
technology transfer specialists. In the paragraphs below, each component of the
present baseline structure of the FISTTS is examined.
It is expected that the FISTTS will evolve from today's NASA-centered baseline into an
equitable, coordinated system which facilitates and possibly increases the transfer of
federal technology to private and public economic concerns. The transitional structure
of the NASA headquarters' TTD organization responsible for establishing the FISTTS
is shown in figure 2. Figures 2A, 2B and 2C illustrate the phased evolution of NASA's
TTD into a component of the FISTTS, based on certain philosophical considerations to
be introduced in later sections. The FISTTS incorporates NASA's technology transfer
system which was developed over the course of the last twenty-seven years. A major
component of the old NASA capability, Industrial Application Centers (IACs), was
replaced by a Technology Transfer Center System (TTCS). The new TTCS is
designed to provide more pro-active and interactive (value-added) technology transfer
services to American industry and federal laboratories.
While the NASA headquarters' TTD is responsible for establishing the FISTTS, it must
simultaneously transform itself from an independently operating entity, into a co-
operating component of a federal system in which all technology producing federal
agencies are aligned toward achieving the common goal of technology transfer to
enhance U.S. international competitiveness. Therefore, in addition to the emerging
Technology Transfer Center(s) System (TTCS), the FlSTTS consists of two additional
functional components: (1) the relatively mature NASA TTD or NASA Extra-Sector
Technology Transfer System (NESTTS) ( where "extra-sector" implies transfer from
NASA and its aerospace industry sector to other industrial sectors, such as mining,
agriculture, etc.); and, (2) a soon to be established working interface for other
governmental agencies. Figure 2A shows the organizational relationship between
these three top level components of the FISFrS.
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4.2 Technology Transfer Center System
The TTCS consists of a National Technology Transfer Center (NTTC) and six Regional
Technology Transfer Centers (RTTCs) (The NTTC and RTTCs began operating under
contract to NASA headquarters in FY 1991 and FY 1992, respectively). This new
system is in a "start-up" mode and is combining the twenty-seven year experience
base from the former IACs with a new, pro-active approach. The NTTC and RTTCs
must actively develop and establish channels of communication between U.S. industry
and all federal laboratories. This activity is designed toincrease the level of
awareness of federal technology availability throughout, and encourage or induce
more technology research anddeveloprnent coo-per_a_onand application. Both'the
NTTC and the RTTCs are operated by non-profit orga0j_ations contracted to NASA for
five years. Each RTTC organization must attempt (either intra- or extra-regionally) to
augment its basic funding in areas directly related to the objectives specified in the
statement of work.
As discussed in the previous section, the TTCS is a relatively independent arm of the
FISTTS. According to the NASA contract, the TTCS must primarily serve NASA.
However, the TTCS must also expand its capacity to assist other governmental
agencies and laboratories, through the established Federal Laboratory Consortium
(FLC) for technology transfer. The NASA Headquarters' TTD monitors the performance
of the overall TTCS and provides the necessary funding and direction. The NTTC is
supposed to provide top level guidance and support to the six RTTC working level
components. Figure 3A shows the emerging 1992 baseline structure of the TTCS.
Each of the six RTTCs in the TTCS operate as a marketing field agent for any federal
laboratory. In general, the RTTCs perform regional market analyses, and planning and
implementation functions for a designated region comprised of five or more states. In
so doing, each RTTC penetrates and analyzes regional industrial structures down to
the company level. In addition, the RTTCs analyze and penetrate regional state
governmental structures down to the local level. These activities develop, establish
and maintain working relationships which facilitate more efficient transfer of
technology by concentrating on specific private (and/or public) needs or problems that
may be addressed by federally generated technologies.
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4.3 NASA Extra-Sector Techn01ogy Transfer System
The present NESTTS (or NASA TTD) has four main functional components/arms: (1)
Applications Engineering; (2) Outreach; (3) Software Engineering and Distribution;
and (4) Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Distribution. Also, a
communications network upgrade function, which has no direct technology transfer
function, is not included. Each arm, and the instruments through which it operates, is
identified and described below:
Applications Engineering: NASA field Installations/Technology Transfer Offices
(TTOs); A Technology Application Teams (TAT) provided by Research Triangle
Institute (RTI).
Outreach: NASA field Installations/TTOs; Center for Aerospace Information
(CASI); Stanford Research Institute (SRI); International Computer and
Telecommunications (ICT); Associated Business Publications (ABP).
Software Engineering and Distribution: NASA field Installations/TTOs;
Computer Software Management and Information Center (COSMIC); Repository-
Based Software Engineering (RBSE).
Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Distribution: NASA Field
Installations/TTOs; Technology Application Center (TAC).
(CASI, COSMIC, RBSE, TAC are all institutions established by the Technology
Transfer Program and operated by different concerns under contract to NASA
headquarters' TTD. SRI, ICT, and RTI are contractors which provide different support
services to the program. ABP is a contractor provides a zero cost service to the
program.)
Within the NESTTS software and hardware technology transfers are accomplished in
different ways. Essentially, the field Installations provide COSMIC with software
specific technology which might have commercial potential. COSMIC then determines
the commercial potential, and then processes and markets, thereby transferring the
software to the commercial sector. Hardware technology, on the other hand, is
processed and transferred by the technology application team. Both the hardware and
software transfer processes are independent arms of the NESTTS (and FISTTS), each
having distinct technology transfer functions. Both of these areas benefit indirectly from
the activities of the outreach function.
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Collectively, the NASA field Installations, and their TTOs are the most critical
component of the NESTTS. The nine field Installations produce/generate hardware
and software related technical information which is processed and transferred by the
TTOs. Figure 2A shows the NESTTS structure within the emerging FISTTS and
includes the communications network upgrade function (the upgrade task is discussed
in an upcoming subsection). The present transitional and baseline operating structure
of each functional component of the NASA TTD (see figure 2) is described in the
sections that follow.
4.3.1 /_,pplications Engineering _ystem
Applications engineering is defined as the process by which adaptive engineering
projects are identified, selected and managed, with the committed participation of
(user organization) industrial partners, in order to transfer NASA technology from the
aerospace sector to the non-aerospace industrial sectors. Applications Engineering is
concerned with the active identification of secondary uses for hardware (and software
to some extent) technologies.
NASA headquarters' Technology Transfer Division (TTD), monitors the pefformanceof
the system and provides the necessary funding and some direction. At the workTng
level, each field Installation generates technology and, through its TTO, attempts to
cultivate technology transfer projects with companies fro m any State in the United
States. They also try to forge relationships with state and local governments in their _
respective region. (These two activities will soon be performed completely by the
RTTCs). A Technology Application Team (TAT - provided by Research Triangle
Institute (RTI)) provides technical and market analytical support to the NASA field
Installation TTOs and headquarters. The TAT essentially plays an important
middleman or "brokering" role by assisting in matching technology demand with
supply. Figure 4A shows the FY 1992 baseline structure of the applications
engineering system.
4.3.2 Outreach System
Outreach is defined as the process by which transferrable technology and commercial
end-items are advertised and promoted to aerospace and non-aerospace industry
concerns. Outreach is concerned with the conveyance of information pertaining to
actual, potentially "commercializable" technology "end-products" from the Agency's
technology development programs. This system essentially performs the NESTTS
(technology product and/or technology transfer service) marketing activities by
creating broad awareness among potential user groups.
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°NASA headquarters' TTD monitors the performance of the system and provides the
necessary funding and direction to its two primary, production oriented, support
organizations, CASI and ABP. CASI responds to general program inquiries, serves as
an information clearinghouse and referral center, and publishes "Spinoff" magazine.
ABP publishes "Tech Briefs" magazine. At a lower working level, the nine NASA field
Installations generate technology (products) and passes raw and/or partially
processed, new technology information to the system through their TTOs. Two
additional support organizations supplied by headquarters are ICT and SRI. These
two support organizations operate in monthly and/or annual project-like support
modes as intermediate, information refining/processing components between the field
Installations, CASI, and ABP. Figure 5A shows the FY 1992 baseline structure of the
outreach system.
The primary activities performed by this system can be divided into two categories: (1)
pre-adoption (of a technology product), and (2) post-adoption. The pre-adoption
activity involves advertising or information dissemination/distribution. Specific pre-
adoption activities include: the publication of NASA Tech Briefs magazine (which ABP
operates strictly through paid advertising); the Technology 200X series; workshops
and seminars for industry; trade show exhibits; Spinoff magazine; and, popular media
(electronic and print). The post-adoption activity involves what might be considered as
market share analysis to track, identify and document the specific results of related and
unrelated pre-adoption activities (the post-adoption function has not received much
attention in the past).
4.3.3 Software Engineering and Distribution System
Software engineering and distribution is defined as the re-engineering and
subsequent marketing of aerospace software product technology for use in non-
aerospace applications. Software re-engineering is concerned with increasing
software reusability through upgrading and modularization.
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NASA headquarters' TTD, monitors the performance of this system and provides the
necessary funding and direction. Two organizations, COSMIC and RBSE, are
contracted to support NASA headquarters as field agents. COSMIC assesses NASA's
general software product outputs for commercial potential. If evident, COSMIC
modifies (if appropriate), advertises and distributes the software to the private sector.
Although supported financially by NASA headquarters, to some extent, COSM!C
operates in a n0n'profit mode only charging its Customers enough to cover any-_::_
remaining costsl also attempts to operate as a profit center), RBSEperforms aSimilar:
function to COSMIC but specializes in the reuse and documentation of Ada language
software applications (AdaNET) (RBSE has been in operation for about three years)
At a lower working level the nine field Installations generate the software technoiogy
(product) Which_istransmitted to COSMIC and RBSE as raw material for additional
processing and packaging. Figure 6A shows the FY 1992 baseline structure for the
software engineering system.
4.3.4 Remote Sensing and Infqrmation Distribution System
Remote sensing and (geographic) information distribution is defined as the marketing
of remote sensing data and technology for non-aerospace related terrestrial
applications. _-_
NASA headquarters' TTD, monitors the performance of this system and provides the
necessary funding and direction. One organization, TAC, is a contracted to support
NASA headquarters as field agent. TAC collects image processing technology and
remote sensing data received from NASA and provides technology and expertise to
industry. At a lower working level, the nine field Installations generate the information
processing technology (product) and remote sensing data which are transmitted to
TAC as raw material for marketing. Figure 7A shows the FY 1992 baseline structure for
the remote sensing and information distribution system.
4.3.5 Commvnications Netwqrk Upgrade System
Communications network upgrade is a planned contractual effort which does not
contribute directly to the technology transfer objective of the NASA "I-ID. It will be
concerned with the expansion and improvement of a computerized network of new
technology information. This new network will replace an old version which never
achieved its planned level of performance and usability. The end-result should be an
increase in the communicative efficiency of the NESTTS (and eventually, the FISTTS).
NASA headquarters' TTD will monitor the upgrade of the computerized network and
provide the necessary funding and direction. The field Installations will be the primary
source of network information and communications traffic.
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The upgraded network software architecture will be designed to consist of a "central
repository" with several geographically separate input/output access locations. The
data/information contained in the repository will be supplied and maintained by NASA
field Installations. The new network is supposed to facilitate more rapid collection and
dissemination of new technology information by NASA's TTOs (field Installations) and
technology transfer agents in the TTCS. Essentially, the network will be a support tool
with an integrative, information storage and transmission function. Figure 8 indicates
how this task might be executed organizationally.
4.4 Near-Term Direction and Aims
NASA Headquarters' Technology Transfer Division presently has two main
responsibilities relative to the emerging FISTTS: (1) the continued management of the
day to day operations of the current NASA TTD; and, (2) the overall design,
development and implementation of the emerging FISTTS. Table 1 shows the present
real total funding and performance period plans for each contractual component of the
current NASA TTD.
Approximately one-third of the TTD's FY 1993 financial resources (a Congressionally
imposed apportionment) is intended to be directed towards the development of the
national and regional technology transfer center system. This level of expenditure
(which might decrease slightly in FY 1994) is aimed at bringing the TTCS to an early
operational level by FY 1995.
Of the remaining two-thirds, about fifty percent will probably go toward supporting the
applications engineering system. This amount (which might increase slightly in FY
1994) is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of this relatively mature operational
system. Another twenty percent will most likely go toward the software engineering
system. This amount is aimed at operating the mature COSMIC component of this
operational system and further augmenting the relatively new RBSE/AdaNET addition
(which also receives a Congressionally imposed apportionment). The remaining thirty
percent will probably go toward the outreach system, the communications network
upgrade, and other areas. This amount is aimed at maintaining the outreach system
(CASI, ABP, etc.) and upgrading the TTD/TTO communications network.
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4.5 Future Program Objectives
In relation to the overall developmental goals of the FISTTS, NASA headquarters
Technology Transfer Division has outlined the following objectives:
Develop and operate a Federal Inter-Sector Technology Transfer System in
cooperation with leading federal Research and Development agencies. With respect
to this objective, the TTD states that NASA will:
-- Establish agency-to-agency agreements to support the system.
-- Facilitate the transfer of all federal technology to the U.S. private sector.
-- Actively employ federal technology transfer and the system/network as a
means of strengthening U.S. industrial competitiveness.
- Continually improve the NASA extra-sector technology transfer process to
accelerate the secondary use of NASA technologies throughout the U.S. private and
public sectors.
- Promote innovative approaches to shorten the time between NASA technology
development and commercial applications.
Increase volume and effectiveness of NASA/industry partnerships via Space
Act agreements and technology applications projects.
Focus NASA technology applications projects to maximize economic benefits.
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5.0 Strengths and Weaknesses
5.1 0urrent Strength8
The technology transfer effort within NASA has developed into a fairly well known and
respected effort from an external (to NASA) perspective. Today, in a time of increasing
emphasis on clear demonstrations of economic relevance, the TTD's program offers
NASA the opportunity to enhance its socio-economic responsiveness. At this point, the
TTD's key strengths are identified as:
A well established network of technology transfer contacts/expertise;
- Well developed information distribution channels based on the nationally
recognized technology transfer publications, "Tech Briefs" and "Spinoffs, which have
become synonymous with the Agency's technology transfer effort;"
Strong Congressional favor and support for the intrinsic national value of
federal technology.
5.2 Current Weaknesses
It became quite clear in the "Internal Environmental Assessment" section, that the TTD
has been largely neglected and ignored by the Agency's "mainstream" internal
establishment for many years. Due to the difficulty accompanying these circumstances
throughout the years, the "FI-D was unable to properly achieve institutional support and
alignment. Consequently, and also due to some lack of aggressiveness on its own
behalf, the TTD has operated under vaguely defined organizational structures with
goals and objectives largely apart from the NASA mainstream establishment. Four key
weaknesses have developed over time:
- "Bottle-necking" of information output from the critical field Installation
Technology Transfer Office components due to insufficient resources (the weakness of
these components reduce the efficiency of the entire system);
-- Insufficient resources available (at headquarters and the field
Installations) to enable more understanding and identification of potential technology
transfer opportunities which might be available at each stage of a technology's
development.
- A lack of inter-organizational/communications linkages between headquarters'
program offices;
A lack of systemic tracking and performance measurement mechanisms.
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6.0 Strategy and Implementation
As was stated in the introduction, the main objectives of this study are to (1) analyze
and characterize the NASA TTD's environment and past organizational structure, (2)
clearly identify current and prospective programmatic efforts, (3) determineaY_
evolutionary view of an organizational structure which could lead to the
accomplishment of the NASA TTD's future goals and objectives, and (4) formulate a
strategy and implementation plan to continue and improve NASA's (andother federal
agencies') ability to transfer technology to the non-aerospace sectors of the U.S.
economy. The first, second and third objectives were addressed in previous sections.
This section introduces a strategy and implementation approaches which wm
potentially satisfy the aims of the fourth objective.
6.1 H_rmonization and Responsiveness Strategy
In the broadest sense, the harmonization and responsiveness strategy aims to
harmonize or coordinate all public sector technology transfer arms/instruments to
make them more responsive, as a whole, to the private sector's technology transfer
needs. This implies that each federal agency must clearly define and increase the
sensitivity of its respective technology transfer instruments. For the NASA TTD, the
assessment of its internal and external environment, the description of its present
evolutionary characteristics, and identification of current strengths and weaknesses, all
point to a strategy based on a continuation of the general evolutionary patterns, but
with a sharper definition of the various organizational sub-structures - through which
public (and private) interfaces (or connections) may be made "better," "faster," and
"cheaper."
The top-level strategy to carry NASA headquarters' TTD from its FY 1992 operating
baseline to a fully integrated FISTTS, by FY 1998, is displayed in figure 1 (The
development of individual, detailed strategies for accomplishing each top-level
milestone was beyond the scope of this study.). The strategy assumes that a funding
level twice that of the FY 1992 total program level (about $32M in FY 1992) is possible
during the FY 1993 through 1994 time-frame; doubling again for the FY 1995 through
1996 time-frame; and leveling off at five times the FY 1992 level beyond FY 1996.
These funding assumptions are based on current (internal and external) political (and
economic) trends, and critical strategical effectiveness needs. In addition, this
assumption does not violate the new NASA Administrator's "better, faster, cheaper"
theme. Instead, it is a recognition of the fact that the Agency's mainstream has
consistently neglected its commercial non-aerospace responsibilities (refer to section
3.0); and, a realization that, in the economic environment of the future, the Agency
must seriously attend to ensuring the most reasonable "return on investment" to the
"commercial" society which finances its existence.
16
In this section the name "Commercial Applications Engineering System (CAES)"
replaces "Applications Engineering System" (refer to section 4.3.1); the name "Multi-
Sector Outreach System (MSOS)" replaces "Outreach System" (refer to section 4.3.2);
the name "Software Engineering and Distribution System (SEDS)" replaces "Software
Engineering and Distribution System" (refer to section 4.3.3); and the name "Remote
Sensing and Information Distribution System (RSIDS)" replaces "Remote Sensing and
Information Distribution System" (refer to section 4.3.4). The strategy presented in
figure 1 is interpreted as follows:
- Toward the middle of FY 1993, six-month studies should be performed to
tabulate and measure the preliminary economic effect of the TTCS, CAES, MSOS,
SEDS and RSIDS. This will permit responsiveness to the downward budgetary
pressures (movement) and political sensitivities expected in FY 1994. By the end of
the first quarter of FY 1994 the TTCS component of the FISTTS will be through its start-
up phase. In addition, the NTTC and RTTCs should have smooth, working interfaces,
as well as the NASA TTOs and the RTTCs. Both the NTTC and the NASA TTOs must
initiate coordination with the RTTCs and possess the organizational flexibility
necessary to secure proper interfaces.
In FY 1995 the NESTTS organization will be restructured to reflect the
increased demands being placed on the organization. The MSOS will complete
organizational changes to create a system better equipped to more effectively
interface with standard industry code (SIC) sectors as required.
Between FY 1994 and 1997, most of the five-year support contractual
arrangements used by the NESTTS should be up for renewal. This period should
therefore be used to strategically alter some relationships, remove redundancies, and
streamline the system as necessary. The achievement of operating cost reductions
without compromising key (NESTTS) system capabilities should be the guiding
objective of this activity. Toward the middle of FY 1995, six-month studies should be
performed to tabulate and measure the preliminary economic effect of the TTCS,
CAES, MSOS, SEDS and RSIDS. This will permit greater responsiveness to the
potential downward budgetary pressures (movement) and political sensitivities
expected in FY 1996 and 1997. In FY 1996, all RTTCs should be fully integrated
having operational satellite or affiliate systems in their respective regions. In addition,
a re-organization of the CAES will be accomplished to form new critical interfaces for
the harmonization/coordination of technological emphases with business and
industry, and other governmental agencies, etcetera.
By the end of FY 1998, each bilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between NASA and other technology producing government agencies should be well
established and functioning. Interfaces between the RTTCs, regional businesses, and
state and local governments should be fully operational.
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6.2 Implementation Plan
The organizational methodology which will be used to implement the strategy
described above is graphically portrayed in figures 2A, 2B, and 2C; 3A, 3B, and 3C;
4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D; 5A, 5B, 5C, and 5D; 6A, 6B, 6C; and 7. In order to maximize the
chances for success, the evolutionary organizational structures shown are formulated
based on balance, alignment, relevance, centrality, and change. More pronounced or
visible product and function areas, technology and industry sectors, as Showfiin
figures 4C and 4D and 5C and 5D, respectively, would promote/facilitate more efficient
internal and external interactions. At the same time, the ability of crucial external
constituencies ( the Administration, Congress, and Industry) to understand and
communicate the Agency's technology transfer aims should be enhanced. Clearly, the
vagueness (identified as a factor contributing to current weaknesses - see section 5.2)
which has restricted NASA TTD'sexternal and internal interfacing capabilities is
eliminated by this organizational approach. Toward FY 2000, this evolving (FISTTS)
organization offers greater product and function coordination which should lead to
better categorization of outputs, and sharper, more communicable and identifiable
organizational performance measurements from the overall system and each of its
components, and an overall increase in the Agency's technology transfer efficiency
and effectiveness.
6.2.1 Weakness Correction
Considering the strategy and implementation approach outlined above, each of the
weaknesses identified in the previous section is addressed in the following manner:
- The TTO bottle-necking identified in the previous section compromises the
efficiency and effectiveness of the entire FISTTS. This is the system's most critical
component. Figures 3B, 4A, 5A, and 6A clearly illustrate the critical reliance the
technology transfer function has on the field Installations, through the TTOs. The only
way to correct this problem is to increase the resources assigned to the TTOs. Strong
and consistent internal (upper management) support (encouraging science and
engineering personnel to embrace technology transfer as one of their critical duties
and quickly transfer their technology/knowledge), especially at the field Installation, is
probably the only way the weakness of this critical component can be corrected. In
other words, an increase in resources should reduce (or eliminate) the primary and
secondary effects of the bottleneck in this systemically important area. It should also
enable TTO and headquarters personnel to penetrate and capture transfer
opportunities occurring at deeper levels in the technology development process.
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Next, the lack of clearly identifiable inter-organizational/communications
linkages is another weakness which has evolved over time. The same factors that
produced the field Installation bottleneck have contributed to the creation of this
weakness as well. Organizational/functional ambiguity (from both an external and
internal perspective) has resulted in too much high level involvement/decision-making
for lower level functions. This ambiguity has occurred due to the lack of a clearly
defined organizational structure, with clearly distributed, fully accountable points of
contact. Better organizational definition leading to greater authority, accountability and
responsibility at the lower levels would correct this weakness.
Concerning tracking and measurement deficiencies, responsibility for this
activity should be placed in each of the critical functional areas which has direct
external interfaces. In the NESTTS, for example, the CAES and MSOS have such
interfaces with their NASA employed and contracted components. With reference to
the present baseline organizational structures, the TTOs, CASI and ICT, for example,
are the components at which some important system performance measurements can
be made. When the NTTC and RTTCs are included, the entire FISFI'S performance
can be measured and tracked by centrally integrating and analyzing all the data from
these sources within the NASA headquarters' TTD.
7.0 Conclusion
NASA's long experience (twenty-seven years) in technology transfer makes the
Agency a reasonable choice to plan and initiate a coordinated federal technology
transfer system for the 2000s. If the harmonization and responsiveness strategy is
applied it should produce a well coordinated public sector system with technology
transfer capabilities far superior to anything presently available. This new public sector
working relationship (structure) will provide a highly transparent technology transfer
service. The transparency of the structure would enable any U.S. company to access
federal resources most rapidly, with unprecedented ease. Both private and public
companies (knowledgeable or not knowledgeable about the inner workings of the
system) will be able to acquire federally developed technological know-how, solutions
and expertise from any Agency through any single initial (random) contact point in the
FISTTS. As a consequence, therefore, the (international) competitive postures of a
sizable fraction of commercial non-aerospace businesses and industries might be
significantly enhanced.
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